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Abstract: The IEEE Std 802.15.6 is an international standard for wireless body area networks (WBANs).
It contains many aspects of communications, and also provides security services, since some
communications in WBANs can carry sensitive information. In this standard, the password
authenticated association is a protocol for two participants to identify each other and establish
a new master key based on a pre-shared short password. However, recent research shows that this
protocol is vulnerable to several attacks. In this paper, we propose an improved protocol which
can resist all of these attacks. Moreover, the improved protocol alleviates computational burden on
one side of the two participants, the node, which is usually less powerful compared with the other
side, the hub.
Keywords: body area networks; password authenticated association; security; key establishment;
IEEE 802.15.6
1. Introduction
A wireless body area network (WBAN) is a wireless network of wearable computing devices
including implanted devices embedded inside the body or attached on the skin, and accompanied
devices which humans can carry by hand, in clothes pockets or in bags [1–4]. WBAN applications [5,6]
are growing and becoming more indispensable in people’s lives due to the increasing accessability of
network service and computing devices. Despite the great progress in networking and computing
technology, security is one significant factor that influences users’ choice of WBAN applications,
since such applications involve a lot of personal information and therefore are vulnerable to
security issues.
IEEE Standard (Std) 802.15.6 [7] is an international standard for wireless communication
between nodes and hubs in WBANs. It provides strong security for communications that carry
sensitive information. In the security services of this standard, the security association procedure
activates a pre-shared or generates a new shared master key (MK) between a node and a hub.
Several security association protocols suitable for a variety of use cases are provided in this standard.
Among these protocols, password authenticated association [8,9] is a protocol for a node and a hub
to generate a new shared MK from a pre-shared secret, i.e., the password. However, recent research
shows that this protocol is vulnerable to several attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle and impersonation
attacks illustrated in [10], and the off-line dictionary attack and there being a lack of forward secrecy,
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which are discussed in [11,12]. To eliminate these attacks, the authors in [10] also proposes a modified
version to this protocol.
In this paper, an improved password authenticated association protocol is proposed. In the rest of
this paper, we denote this protocol by the improved protocol, protocol in [10] by the modified protocol and
protocol in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard by the standard protocol. Compared with the modified protocol
and the standard protocol, the improved protocol eliminates all the above attacks on one hand.
Moreover, it alleviates computational burden on the node. Since the node usually has limited
computational power compared with the hub, the improved protocol is meaningful in practise.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1 contains preliminaries and
symbols that are useful in this paper. In Section 3, we review the standard protocol and available
attacks in literature. In Section 4, the improved protocol is proposed and its security and performance
are analyzed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 shows a use case of this improved protocol.
Related works are provided in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes this paper.
2. Preliminaries and Symbols
2.1. Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptography
2.1.1. Elliptic Curve
The IEEE 802.15.6 password authenticated association protocol is based on the Diffie–Hellman
key exchange [13] employing the elliptic curve public key cryptography (ECC). An elliptic curve E can
be characterized by the following equation [14,15]:
y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b mod p
with a, b ∈ GF(p), 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (1)
where (x, y) is a point on the curve; a and b are coefficients; p is an odd prime; and GF(p) is a prime
finite field. For the choices of a suitable elliptic curve, the IEEE Std 802.15.6 suggests using Curve
p-256 in FIPS Pub 186-3. Values of a, b, p, the base point G = (Gx, Gy) and the order r of G are given in
the standard.
2.1.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) is an anonymous key agreement protocol that allows
two parties, each having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over
an insecure channel [16]. Suppose SKA and SKB are private keys of two communicating parties A and
B, respectively. SKA and SKB are random integers from the set {1, ..., r− 1}. The corresponding public
keys PKA and PKB are computed as follows:
PKA = SKA × G, PKB = SKB × G (2)
where× denotes scalar multiplication of G by an integer. In the ECDH protocol, A and B exchange their
public keys and compute (xk, yk) = SKA × PKB and (xk, yk) = SKB × PKA, respectively. The shares
key is xk, i.e., the X coordinate of the point.
2.2. Password Authenticated Key Exchange
The password authenticated association protocol in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard is a variation of
password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [8]. A PAKE protocol uses a pre-shared password for
an authenticated key establishment. The password is usually short and easy for humans to remember,
and is not stored directly in the memory of physical devices for security purpose. Instead, it is input
by the users at the beginning of each run of the PAKE protocol.
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2.3. Symbols
The association protocol is initiated by the node to generate a shared master key with the hub from
a pre-shared password between them. We denote the node as the initiator and the hub as the responder.
Some other symbols used in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Symbols and definitions.
Symbol Meaning
I identity of the initiator (i.e., the node)
R identity of the responder (i.e., the hub)
A identity of an adversary
PW the pre-shared password
K the temple Diffie–Hellman key used for computing CMAC
MK the master key to be generated
‖ concatenation of bit strings
SKI , PKI private and public keys of the initiator
SKR, PKR private and public keys of the responder
SKA, PKA private and public keys of the adversary
NI a nonce generated by the initiator
NR a nonce generated by the responder
NA a nonce generated by the adversary
Q(x) a function that maps a positive integer x to a point on the elliptic curve
G base point in the elliptic curve
× scalar multiplication
RMBn(x) the n rightmost bits of x
LMBn(x) the n leftmost bits of x
3. IEEE 802.15.6 Password Authenticated Association Protocol
We review the IEEE 802.15.6 password authenticated association protocol, i.e., the standard
protocol, and discuss its vulnerabilities in this section.
3.1. Description of the Standard Protocol
3.1.1. Set-Up
The initiator and the responder set up their private and public key as follows:
1. Initiator chooses a random SKI and computes the public key PKI = SKI × G.
2. Responder selects its private key SKR and computes PKR = SKR × G.
3.1.2. Master Key Generation
The initiator and the responder execute the following steps to generate a shared master key.
1. The initiator computes a password-scrambled public key
PK′I = PKI −Q(PW) (3)
and sends it to the responder along with a nonce NI and the identities I and R:
M1 = {R, I, NI , PK′I}
2. After receiving M1, the responder sends the identities, a nonce and its public key back to
the initiator:
M2 = {I, R, NR, PKR}
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3. The responder recovers PKI as follows:
PKI = PK′I + Q(PW) (4)
The initiator and the responder compute the Diffie–Hellman key, respectively, through
K = SKI × PKR = SKR × PKI (5)
The responder computes a message authentication code
MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NI‖NR) (6)
and then sends the initiator
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}
4. The initiator verifies the received MAC3. If the verification succeeds, the initiator computes
a message authentication code
MAC4 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), R‖I‖NR‖NI) (7)
and sends the responder
M4 = {R, I, NI , PKI , MAC4}
5. The responder verifies MAC4. If the verification succeed, both parties compute and activate their
new master key as follows:
MK = CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR) (8)
3.2. Security Problems
The standard protocol uses the password to hide the public key of the initiator through
PK′I = PKI − Q(PW) in the first step, so that only the responder can recover PKI from
PKI = PK′I +Q(PW). However, the protocol reveals PKI in M4 of step 4, which means an eavesdropper
who intercepts M4 can acquire Q(PW). In this case, the password is no longer secret in
the following runs of the protocol. This is the reason for the vulnerabilities of the standard protocol.
Security problems and attacks to this standard protocol in literature are summarized as follows:
1. Impersonation attack. In [10] the authors illustrate an initiator impersonation attack and a responder
impersonation attack to the standard protocol. At the end of these attacks, the attackers
successfully establish a master key with one side of the communicating parties, while the other
side thinks it has the shared master key with the true participant.
2. Man-in-the-Middle attack. In [10], the authors show that an attacker breaks into the
communication between the initiator and the responder and modifies the messages at his/her will.
At last, the attacker shares two master keys with the initiator and the responder, respectively, while
the initiator and the responder think they have a shared master key. Figure 1 is a time-sequence
diagram that illustrates the procedure of man-in-the middle attack against the protocol.
3. Off-line dictionary attack. The authors in [11,12] show that a dictionary attacker who eavesdrops
messages between the initiator and the responder in a protocol run can obtain PK′I and PKI
and compute Q(PW) from Q(PW) = PKI − PK′I . Then, Q(PW) can be used as a verifier and
the attacker can try probable PWs from a dictionary of most probable passwords and check them
using Q(PW).
4. Lack of forward secrecy. The author in [11,12] illustrates that if SKI has been compromised by
an attacker, the attacker can acquire the Diffie–Hellman key K through computing K = SKI × PKR
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and MK from MK = CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR) since PKR, NI and NR are sent in the form
of plaintext.
Figure 1. The sequence diagram of Man-in-the-Middle attack.
3.3. The Modified Protocol
The authors in [10] propose a modified protocol to the standard protocol. Specifically, the modified
protocol is similar to the standard one except that it does not send PKI in the clear in M4.
This modification solves most security problems as we mentioned in Section 3.2, but it still fails
to provide forward secrecy. We will compare security and performance of the two protocols with those
of our new proposed protocol later in this paper.
4. The Improved Protocol
The improved protocol assumes that PK and SK can be reused in each round of protocol.
This assumption is reasonable since, in the improved protocol, the temporary Diffie–Hellman key K is
derived from two random values chosen by the initiator and the responder, respectively, rather than
their public and private keys. The improved protocol is described in detail as follows.
1. The initiator chooses a random value RI and computes
UI = RI + SKI (9)
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and
PK′I = PKI −Q(PW) (10)
Then, the initiator sends message M1 to the responder.
M1 = {I, R, UI , PK′I , NI}
2. The responder chooses a random value RR and computes
UR = RR + SKR (11)
and
TR = UR × G (12)
Then, the responder sends message M2 to the initiator
M2 = {R, I, TR, PKR, NR}
3. The responder recovers PKI as follows:
PKI = PK′I + Q(PW) (13)
The initiator computes the Diffie–Hellman key through
K = (TR − PKR)× RI = G× RR × RI (14)
The responder computes K as follows
K = (UI × G− PKI)× RR = G× RR × RI (15)
With the K, the responder computes a message authentication code
MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NI‖NR) (16)
and then sends the initiator
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}
4. The initiator verifies the received MAC3. If the verification succeeds, the initiator computes a
message authentication code
MAC4 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), R‖I‖NR‖NI) (17)
and sends the responder
M4 = {R, I, NI , MAC4}
5. The responder verifies MAC4. If the verification succeeds, both parties compute and activate
their new master key as follows:
MK = CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR) (18)
5. Security Analysis
In Section 3.2, we listed all the attacks to the standard protocol, and in this section, we will prove
the security of the improved protocol under all of these attacks.
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5.1. Impersonation Attack
Proposition 1. Suppose the initiator and the responder have shared a password PW secretly, and an attacker is
not able to impersonate the initiator to establish the master key MK with the responder.
Proof. Assume AI is an attacker who attempts to impersonate the initiator and establish MK with
the responder. AI attacks the protocol as follows:
1. AI initializes the protocol with the responder by sending the first message MA1 as follows:
MA1 = {I, R, UA, PK′I , NA}
where UA = RA + SKA and RA and NA are random values generated by AI .
2. After receiving MA1, the responder chooses a random value RR and computes UR = RR + SKR
and TR = UR × G. Then, the responder replies AI with M2:
M2 = {R, I, TR, PKR, NR}
3. The responder recovers PKI and computes K = (UA × G − PKI) × RR. Then, the responder
computes MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NA‖NR) and sends the following message M3
to AI :
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}
4. At this step, AI needs to send the responder with MACA4, which should be equivalent with
CMAC64(RMB128(K), R‖I‖NR‖NA) so that it can pass the verification at the beginning of
the next step.
In step 4, in order to compute a valid MACA4, AI has to calculate K equals K = (UA × G −
PKI)× RR = (RA × G + PKA − PKI)× RR. However, without any of PKI and RR, AI has no choice
but to guess such a MACA4. The probability of guessing a valid MACA4 is 1264 .
Alternatively, in the first piece of message MA1, the adversary AI can send a UI intercepted in
previous protocol runs instead of UA. In this case, K computed by the responder in step 3 equals
(UI × G− PKI)× RR, G× RI × RR and (TR − PKR)× RI . It is still infeasible for AI to compute the K
since RR and RI are unknown to AI .
From the above analysis, now we can draw the conclusion that the probability for AI successfully
impersonating the initiator and establishing a master key with the responder is 1264 , which is a minor
value in a life circle of a normal node in WBAN applications.
Proposition 2. Suppose the initiator and the responder have shared a password PW secretly, and an attacker is
not able to impersonate the responder to establish the master key MK with the initiator.
Proof. Assume AR is an attacker who intends to impersonate the responder and establish MK with
the initiator. AR attacks the protocol as follows:
1. The initiator sends AR with M1, which is the same with the step 1 in the improved protocol:
M1 = {I, R, UI , PK′I , NI}
2. After receiving M1, AR replies the initiator with MA2:
MA2 = {R, I, TA, PKA, NA, }
with TA = UA × G and UA = RA + SKA, where SKA is the private key of AR and RA and NA are
random values generated by AR.
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3. At this step, AR needs to send the initiator with MACA3 involved in MA3, so that it can pass the
verification at the beginning of the next step.
The MACA3 is checked to be valid only if it equals CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NI‖NA). In order
to generate a valid MACA3, AR can compute the CMAC output by inputting K, I, R, NI , NA or guess
the 64-bit result. To compute the CMAC output, AR has to calculate K that equals the K calculated
by the initiator through K = (TA − PKA)× RI = G× RA × RI . However, since RI is unknown to AR,
it is infeasible for AR to acquire a valid K. Therefore, the adversary can only guess a valid MACA3
with a successful probability at 1264 . Otherwise, the protocol will stop at the beginning of step 4 and
the attack will fail.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we can see impersonation attacks fail no matter if the attacker
impersonates the initiator or the responder.
5.2. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Proposition 3. Suppose the initiator and the responder have successfully shared a password PW,
a Man-in-the-Middle attacker is not able to complete the improved protocol between the initiator and the responder
without being detected.
Proof. Suppose A is a Man-in-the-Middle attacker between the initiator and the responder.
A participants the improve protocol as follows:
1. The initiator sends A with M1 which is the same with M1 in the improved protocol:
M1 = {I, R, UI , PK′I , NI}.
2. A replaces M1 with M1A and sends it to the responder:
MA1 = {I, R, UA, PK′I , NA}.
3. The responder replies A with M2 which is the same with M2 in the improved protocol:
M2 = {R, I, TR, PKR, NR}.
4. A sends MA2 to the initiator:
MA2 = {R, I, TA, PKA, NA}.
5. At this step, the Diffie–Hellman key KIA between A and the initiator and KRA between A and
the responder are determined. Specifically, the initiator calculates KIA = (TA − PKA)× RI =
G× RA × RI , and the responder calculates KRA = (UA × G− PKI)× RR = (RA × G + PKA −
PKI)× RR.
The responder computes MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(KRA), I‖R‖NA‖NR) and sends A with M3:
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}
6. A should send the initiator with
MA3 = {I, R, NA, PKA, MACA3}.
where MACA3 = CMAC64(RMB128(KIA), I‖R‖NI‖NA)
7. The initiator verifies MACA3.
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8. A should send the responder with
MA4 = {R, I, NA, MACA4},
where MACA4 = CMAC64(RMB128(KRA), I‖R‖NA‖NR).
9. The responder verifies MACA4.
Since A does not have any of RI , RR, PK′I , it is infeasible for A to compute KIA and KRA, and
therefore A can not compute correct MACA3 in step 3A and MACA4 in step 4A. Without valid MACA3
and MACA4, the initiator will stop the protocol at the beginning of step 4, and the responder will
stop at the beginning of step 5, which means A fails to establish an MK either with the initiator or
the responder.
5.3. Off-Line Dictionary Attack
Proposition 4. Suppose the initiator and the responder have successfully shared a password PW, and a passive
eavesdropper who records one or more sessions of the improved protocol cannot eliminate a significant number of
possible passwords.
Proof. In the improved protocol, values that are sent in the clear include I, R, UI , PK′I , NI , TR, PKR, NR,
MAC3 and MAC4. In order to carry out an off-line dictionary attack, the adversary needs to acquire
information that can help him to check possible passwords from a dictionary. Among all of these values
sent in the clear, PW has a relationship only with PK′I through the equation PK′I = PKI − Q(PW).
PKI is kept secretly in the protocol, and PKI = SKI × G, where SKI is a random integer. Therefore,
PKI is a random value and is unknown to the adversary. The equation of PK′I = PKI −Q(PW) and the
value of PK′I do not give more information of PW to the attacker. Based on this acquired knowledge,
the attacker is unable to eliminate possible passwords.
According to Proposition 4, an off-line dictionary attack to the improved protocol is infeasible.
5.4. Forward Secrecy
Proposition 5. Suppose the initiator and the responder have successfully shared a password PW, and
compromise of the long-term secret keys of a set of principals does not compromise the MKs established in
previous runs of the improved protocol involving those principals.
Proof. The principals of this protocols are the initiator and the responder, and the long-term secret
keys of these principals are the private keys SKI and SKR, the password PW and the public key
PKI that is masked during transmission. Assume the adversary A compromises these long-term
secrets of the initiator and the responder, and then (s)he has SKI , SKR, PW and PKI . In order
to calculate an MK established in a previous run, A needs to compute MK from the formula
MK = CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR), where K is a necessary input in that run. Note that A can
not use these values to run the protocol with the principals, since, in this case, the MK does not
belong to a previous run but is established in the current run. Therefore, A has to compute K through
K = (TR − PKR) × RI , K = (UI × G − PKI) × RR or K = G × RR × RI . All three of the formulas
require at least one of RI and RR. However, RI and RR are random values chosen by the initiator and
the responder, respectively, in each run of the protocol, which means that these values change in every
protocol run and are kept unknown to A. Without any of RI and RR, A fails to compromise the MK,
although (s)he compromises all the long-term secret keys and values.
From Proposition 5, we can see the improved protocol provides forward secrecy.
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6. Performance
In order to observe the performance of the improved protocol, we evaluate the computation
and communication cost theoretically. In addition, we also test the performance through a set
of experiments.
6.1. Evaluation
The overall burden of the protocol contains three parts: communication cost, computation cost on
the node and computation cost on the hub. For the communication cost, we count all of the pieces
of messages transmitted between the node and the hub within a run of the protocol. In order to
evaluate the computation cost, we count the number of cryptographic algorithm CMAC and scalar
multiplication of an element from the ecliptic curve by an integer, since other operations such as
addition and subtraction require minor computation cost.
Denote the cost of transmitting a piece of message by M, the cost of executing one CMAC
algorithm by H, and the cost of executing the operation of scalar multiplication one time by S ,
and we compare the evaluated cost of the improved protocol with the modified protocol and
the standard protocol in Table 2.
Table 2. Evaluation of performance.
Protocol Computation Cost Computation Cost Total Computation Communicationon Node the Hub Cost Cost
improved protocol S + 2H 3S + 2H 4S + 4H 4M
modified protocol 2S + 2H 2S + 2H 4S + 4H 4M
standard protocol 2S + 2H 2S + 2H 4S + 4H 4M
From Table 2, we can see that the improved protocol reduces computation cost on the node,
while overall computation and communication cost does not increase. One time-consuming operation
S is done by the hub on behalf of the node. Since the hub is more powerful compared with the node,
the improved protocol is more affordable for WBAN applications.
6.2. Experiments
The improved protocol contains the algorithm of CMAC and ECC key-generation (generating a private
key and using scalar multiplication to compute the public key). We test the runtime of these algorithms
on the node through a set of experiments. In the experiments, we use Arduino Uno as the node,
SHA-256 as the CMAC algorithms and the ATECC108A crypto chip from Atmel to execute the ECC
key-generation. The elliptic curve is curve p-256 in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
Pub 186-3. Description of the node is listed in Table 3, and the results are summarized in Table 4.
Table 3. Details of the node (implemented on Arduino Uno).
Micro Controller 16 MHz, 8 bit (ATmega328)
SRAM 2 KB
EEPROM 1 KB
Flash memory 32 KB (bootloader 0.5 K)
Table 4. Run-time of involved cryptographic algorithms on the node.
Algorithm Length of Keys (Bits) Runtime (ms)
ECC key generation – 48
SHA-256 512 3
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From Table 4, we can see that the run-time of executing these algorithms is affordable for the node,
which means that the improved protocol is suitable for WBAN applications.
7. Use Case
As described before, our improved protocol reduced the computational burden on one side
of communication. This is a significant strength for some applications in wireless sensor networks.
Here, we describe a smart lock system that uses our improved protocol to generate a master key.
The specific system and the usage of the improved protocol are described as follows.
7.1. Smart Lock System
As is shown in Figure 2, the smart lock system consists of a lock which is a physical host
embedded with a computational device, and a phone which has installed a smart lock application.
The aim of this system is using this phone application to securely lock or unlock the lock.
Obviously, the computationally limited lock is the initiator and the relatively powerful phone is
the responder. The smart lock system includes the following three phases, and our protocol is involved
in the first phase.
Figure 2. Smart lock system.
1. Master Key Generation. The lock and the phone secretly input the short password and then
execute our improved protocol. After this stage, a relatively long master key is shared by the lock
and the phone.
2. Session Key Generation. With the master key, the lock and the phone execute the session key
generation protocol (such protocols are available in literature) to generate their session key for
this round of communication.
3. Secure Communication. The newly generated session key is used for this round of
communication between the phone and the lock. We describe the steps as:
(1) The phone computes
MAC = HMAC(sessionkey, P‖L‖Request‖Counter)
and sends the request (LOCK/UNLOCK) with the MAC to the lock. Here, P and L denote
the identity of the phone and the lock, and Counter denotes the value of counter.
(2) The lock verifies the MAC. If the verification succeeds, the lock executes the request to lock
or unlock; otherwise, it does not execute the request or responds with a failure message.
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7.2. Analysis
The smart lock system is secure since the session key is kept secretly by the two participants.
An adversary can not request the system to lock or unlock because they can not compute the correct
MAC without the session key. Therefore, the security of the session key is significant for the security
of the whole system. Our improved protocol provides secure generation for the master key, which,
in turn, guarantees the security of the session key.
Additionally, the device embedded in the lock is a less powerful device compared with a normal
cell phone. Our password-based authenticated association protocol in the first phase reduces
the computational cost of the lock, which makes the smart lock system more practicable.
8. Related Works
8.1. Comparison
In Section 6.1, we compared the cost of the improved protocol with other related protocols
in Table 2. The comparison in terms of security of these protocols is listed in Table 5, where
√
means being secure under the corresponding attacks or providing the corresponding security feature,
while ×means being insecure or not providing.
Table 5. Comparison of security (“
√
” denotes the protocol resist the attack or possess the security
feature, and “×” denotes the the protocol does not resist the attack or does not possess
the security feature).









8.2. Password-Based Two-Party Key Exchange
Several password-based authenticated key exchange protocols have been proposed. In this
subsection, we compare our improved protocol with three kinds of two-party key exchange protocols
that are based on passwords.
8.2.1. Encrypted Key Exchange Using Diffie–Hellman
Diffie–Hellman-based Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocols transmit the public keys
encrypted using the password. The original protocol is proposed by Bellovin and Merritt in [17].
Variants and extensions of this protocol have been proposed. Such protocols are proved to be
secure in the random-oracle model. However, in practice, attacks against these protocols exist since
the two parties are not able to verify the integrity of the received messages. If an attacker maliciously
modifies the message, the two participants will generate different keys while they are not aware.
The IEEE Std password authenticate association protocol and our improved protocol are
developed from these kinds of protocols. As in the IEEE std protocol and our improved protocol
Hash-based Message Authenticated Code (HMAC) is used for verifying the integrity of messages
transmitted between the two parties, the above attacks against the original Diffie–Hellman-based EKE
protocols are eliminated.
8.2.2. RSA-Based Protocols
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)-Based Protocols use the RSA algorithm as the basis of the password
authentication key exchange scheme. In [18], MacKenzie proposed a variant of RSA based open
key exchange protocol called SNAPI (Secure Network Authentication with Password Information).
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Verification for the integrity of transmitted messages is involved in this protocol. However, this protocol
is not suitable for wireless sensor networks since sensors are usually not powerful enough to run
the RSA algorithm.
8.2.3. Protocols Using a Server Public Key
Some password-based authenticated key exchange protocols use a server public key in addition
to the pre-shared password. Such protocols include the Gong-Lomas-Needham-Saltzer (GLNS)
compact protocol proposed by Gong et al. in [19], Gong’s Optimal GLNS nonce-based protocol
in [20], Kwon–Song Protocol in [21] and Halevi–Krawczyk Protocol in [22]. However, all four of
the protocols used public key encryption, which is too high in computational cost for sensor devices.
Moreover, the former two protocols need the participation of a server.
9. Conclusions
In low-power, low-complexity wireless sensor network applications such as WBANs,
the communications security requirements mainly include authentication between participants, as well
as confidentiality and integrity of transmitted messages. Mechanisms that aim to satisfy these
requirements usually need a secret key to be held by participants. Therefore, key establishment
and management are significant for security services in communications networks. The password
authenticated association protocol is a scheme for the participants to generate a master key from
a pre-shared password.
Considering the asymmetric power of the two participants in WBANs, we propose an improved
password authenticated association protocol that reduces the computational cost on the less powerful
participant of communication. The improved protocol can resist both impersonation attacks and
Man-in-the-Middle attacks. A master key between the node and the hub will be established securely
and efficiently through this protocol, and, afterwards, this is used for pairwise temporal key (PTK)
creation, and the PTK is the key used in encryption and decryption process to provide authentication,
confidentiality and integrity for communication.
The improved protocol requires one scalar multiplication and two HMAC computations on
the nodes (i.e., the initiator). Since the computational costs of these algorithms are acceptable to devices
with limited power in WBANs, the improved protocol is suitable for applications in WBANs.
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